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JURISDICTION 
Respondents, Garfield County Defendants, agree with 
the statement of jurisdiction contained in Petitioner's brief• 
Respondents will not in this brief restate the jurisdiction of 
the Court to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal by Appellant, Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Co., is from a Decision and Summary Judgment 
upholding the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated §17-19-15. 
Said Decision was premised upon the Court's conclusion that Utah 
Code Annotated, 17-19-15 was a state-wide tax enacted by the 
Utah Legislature to fund the state-wide purpose of achieving 
uniformity and equality of assessment of property taxes by 
establishing a funding mechanism to provide for the uniform 
state-wide administration of the assessment, collection and 
distribution of property taxes. The Court further ruled that 
since the state-wide uniform levy was a tax, and Appellant had 
conceded in the trial court that it was a tax, Appellants' 4th, 
5th, 6th, 7th and 8th claims for relief, which were premised 
upon the assertion that the taxes were in fact a regulatory fee 
rather than a tax, were also dismissed. 
The Decision and Summary Judgment were issued by the 
Honorable Don v. Tibbs, Judge of the Sixth Judicial District 
Court, and were duly entered on the 14th day of October, 19 88. 
(R-238-247.) Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on Novem-
ber 10, 1988. (R248-249.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Whether or not it is constitutionally permissible for 
1 
the Utah State Legislature to pass a law to address the state-
wide concern of achieving equality and uniformity of property 
taxation in the State of Utah. 
2. Whether or not a legislatively established uniform, 
equalized statewide tax levy to fund property tax administration 
in each of the 29 counties of Utah is a valid exercise of 
legislative authority in pursuit of a remedy for a state-wide 
problem. 
3. Whether or not the uniform state-wide tax levy is a 
violation of Appellant's right of due process because the 
revenues derived from the lew exceed the cost of collecting its 
particular taxes. 
4. Whether or not the Plaintiff has standing to challenge 
the effect of the Uniform State-wide Tax Levy upon Garfield 
County. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INCLUDED 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: (See Exhibit 1.) 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS; (See Exhibit 1.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1986, the general legislative session of the Utah 
State Legislature, in response to representatives of local 
governmental entities as well as the state and local school 
boards, enacted into law Section 17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated. 
The statute was passed to address the concern for compliance 
with the constitutional requirement that all tangible property 
be taxed at a uniform and equal rate. Section 17-19-15 estab-
lished an equalized statewide levy to pay for the cost of 
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assessing, collecting and distributing ad valorem property tax 
revenues. 
The statute was first applied in 1987 and again in 
1988. 
Appellant paid its 1988 property taxes under protest 
and thereafter filed a complaint for refund in the district 
court of Garfield County claiming the statute to be unconstitu-
tional. The county defendants (Respondents herein) filed an 
answer and moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff (Appellant 
herein) filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district 
court determined that the statute was constitutional in all 
respects and granted summary judgment to the Defendants. 
Plaintiff appealed to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents object to the "Statements of Facts" set 
forth in Appellant's Brief. Said statement contains argument, 
conclusions and assumptions. It also contains erroneous factual 
assertions and conclusions which are not supported by the record 
before the trial court or this Court on Appeal. For example: 
at page 5, Appellant made the unsupported conclusionary state-
ment that the "Act promotes inefficient and costly tax col-
lection procedures." There are no facts to support this conclu-
sion in the record, and indeed Appellants have cited no portion 
of the record as support for this bald assertion. Appellant 
further asserts that "Every conceivable expense that can be 
denominated a "collection cost" has been so labelled in order to 
obtain the largest possible slice of the Section 17-19-15 pie." 
There are no facts in the record to support this statement. It 
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is nothing more than unsupported argument paraded as a fact by 
the Appellant without any evidence cited to support such a 
conclusion. 
Appellant in its purported fact statement states 
"Assessment and collection costs have increased nearly five fold 
in Davis County—from $329,695 in 1985 to $1,540,923 in 1987." 
There is no evidence in the record to support this statement. 
Appellant's complaint, at Exhibit D (R-40) contained a schedule. 
However, Respondents denied the validity of the schedule and 
Appellants never produced or identified the source of the 
schedule. The uncontroverted affidavit of Brent Gardner 
(R-202-210) shows that for 1985 Davis County, in fact, budgeted 
$1,293,996, in 1985 as the costs of assessing and collecting. 
Rather than the $329,695. claimed by Appellant. Therefore, the 
uncontroverted evidence established that the increase between 
1985 and 1987 in Davis County was not "five fold" as erroneously 
stated by Appellant but, in fact, increased by only 16% over the 
two year period or an average of less than 8% per year rather 
than the 500% asserted by Appellant. On page 8 of Appellants1 
opening brief the following representations are made concerning 
the Attorney General's position on the challenged statute. 
Appellant, in part, states: "...an Attorney General's opinion 
dated February 11, 1988, which found that the Act was unconsti-
tutional. ..." 
The original letter is on the inside cover of the 
record, unnumbered but dated August 26, 1988. It is also 
identified as Exhibit "A" in Appellant's brief. The last 
sentence of the last complete paragraph on page 1 reads as 
follows: "The opinion is an analysis that does not purport to 
bind the Court and is not an unequivocal declaration of 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality." (Emphasis supplied.) 
It should be noted that the letter is signed by the same person 
who wrote the opinion. Again, Appellant has made a misstatement 
to the Court. 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except for the limited role of the State Tax Commis-
sion in assessing certain multi-county or specifically described 
properties, valuation for ad valorem taxation is accomplished in 
the State of Utah through local county officials in each of the 
twenty-nine counties. 
Historically, the State Legislature and the State Tax 
Commission have played a significant role in all local assess-
ment issues. 
S.B. 151 (Codified into Utah Code Annotated, 17-19-15), 
was passed in the 1986 general session by the Utah State Legis-
lature. (R-36-38.) 
The purpose of the legislation was to provide a 
funding mechanism to address a matter of state-wide concern in 
each of the individual counties to wit: the accurate, equitable 
and fair assessment of locally assessed residential, commercial 
and industrial properties as well as the effective and efficient 
collection of ad valorem property tax revenues. (R-96.) 
Prior to the passage of the challenged statute there 
had been seven consecutive years of litigation by railroads 
claiming that local commercial and industrial properties were 
under-assessed. (R-96.) 
In each of the previous four years the Utah State Tax 
Commission had issued orders directing certain counties in Utah 
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to increase assessment levels and at least five lawsuits had 
been filed by the Utah State Tax Commission against local county 
assessors claiming under-assessment of locally assessed prop-
erties within their respective counties, (R-96.) 
While the statute required the State Auditor to set 
forth categories of costs uniform throughout the State to be 
utilized by county commissions or councils in budgeting for the 
cost of assessing, collecting and distributing ad valorem tax 
revenues, the final tax rate was to be determined by the Utah 
State Tax Commission from the aggregated budget total for all 
counties established by the State Auditor. However, the setting 
of the county budget, the controlling of costs through the 
budget process and the expenditure of funds was intended to and 
did remain the responsibility of the Board of County Commission-
ers or council. (R-97.) 
The Utah Association of Counties, by formal resolution 
in November of 1987, expressed its support for the provisions of 
S.B. 151 and opposed any attempt to amend or repeal its pro-
visions. In January of 1988 all 29 counties of the State of 
Utah unanimously expressed their support for the provisions of 
S.B. 151 including the revenue sharing provisions contained in 
the Act and again opposed any attempts to repeal or amend its 
provisions. (97.) 
The Utah State Office of Education, the Utah Asso-
ciation of Counties, the Utah School Boards Association as well 
as the Utah League of Cities and Towns, determined that the 
equalized levy contained in S.B. 151 was a positive solution to 
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the problem of payment for assessing and collecting taxes• 
(R-99.) 
The undisputed facts show that the cost of assessing 
and collecting all ad valorem taxes in the State of Utah after 
the passage of S.B. 151 increased by approximately 14% between 
1985 and 1987 or an average of only 7% per year. In Davis 
County for example, the increase over the two year period 
between 1985 and 1987 was an approximate total of 16% for an 
average increase of less than 8% per year for the two years in 
question. (R-202-208.) 
In 1986 and again in 1987 Respondent, Garfield County 
fully noticed and held public hearings concerning its proposed 
budgets for the years 1987 and 1988. Public inspection of each 
proposed budget during normal working hours was invited. The 
official records of the public hearings indicate that neither 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company nor any person 
identifying themselves as a representative of said company 
appeared at the public hearings on the 1987 and 1988 budget. 
(R-217-233.) 
The Garfield County Commission adopted its budget for 
1987 and 1988. Each budget separately accounted for and includ-
ed all costs associated with the assessing, collecting and 
distributing of taxes. The Garfield County Commission volun-
tarily consented to and approved the revenue sharing between and 
among the several counties of the State for 1987 and 1988. 
(R-224.225.) 
On May 20, 1988, Appellant filed a complaint against 
Garfield County seeking a refund of taxes paid under protest and 
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a declaration that Utah Code Annotated Sections 17-19-15 was 
unconstitutional. (R-l-17.) 
The Garfield County Defendants filed an answer and 
thereafter Appellant and Respondent both sought summary judg-
ment. After allowing appropriate time for briefing by both 
parties, the Court heard argument and on the 14th of October, 
1988, the Court issued its decision that Utah Code Annotated 
Section 17-19-15 was constitutional in all respects. Judgment 
of no cause of action was entered in favor of Respondents and 
against Appellant. (R-238-247.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated was the result 
of several years of efforts on the part of local government, 
local school boards, the Tax Commission and the Utah legislature 
to resolve the statewide concern for equal and uniform valuation 
of property for all ad valorem property taxation. To provide 
the necessary funding to address that statewide concern, the 
legislature adopted a funding mechanism similar to the one 
employed for the State Uniform School Fund. That mechanism was 
a separate equalized statewide tax levy based upon the actual 
budgeted costs of assessing, collecting and distributing proper-
ty tax revenues within each of the 29 counties of the State. 
The funding mechanism employed was a valid exercise of legisla-
tive authority in pursuit of a remedy for a statewide problem. 
The procedures established by Section 17-19-15, Utah Code 
Annotated are consistent with the authority set forth in the 
Utah Constitution for the legislature and the Utah State Tax 
Commission. The procedures set forth in the challenged statute 
8 
are also in keeping with the interpretative decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court and do not violate any provisions of the 
United States or the State of Utah. 
Appellant and Respondents both submitted that matter 
to the trial court for summary judgment. The overarching issue 
presented by both motions was the constitutionality of Section 
17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated. Since Appellant and Respondents 
had each filed motions for summary judgment, each had concluded 
that the legal issue of the constitutionality of Section 17-19-15 
was ripe for final determination. This Court's decision on that 
issue will be a final disposition of the entire case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SENATE BILL NO. 151, (CODIFIED AT UTAH CODE 
ANN. §17-19-15) DULY ENACTED BY THE 1986 
LEGISLATURE, IS PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL AS A 
VALID LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT DESIGNED TO 
PROMOTE EFFICIENT STATEWIDE PROPERTY TAX 
ASSESSMENT, COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION. 
The Appellant seeks to have this Court find the Act 
violative of various provisions of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed 
judicial restraint in finding any duly enacted legislative 
decision unconstitutional. Enactments must be read in a light 
favoring constitutionality with an effort made to resolve any 
doubts in favor of the statute. This principle was clearly 
stated in some detail in Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 
197 P.2d 477, 499 (Utah, 1948). 
It is well settled in this state, as else-
where, that the courts will not declare a 
statute unconstitutional unless it clearly and 
manifestly violates some provision of the 
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Constitution of the state or of the United 
States. Every presumption must be indulged in 
favor of the constitutionality of an act, and 
every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of 
its validity. The whole burden lies on him 
who denies the constitutionality of a legisla-
tive enactment. If by any fair interpretation 
of the statute the legislation can be upheld, 
it is the duty of this court to sustain it, 
even though judges may view the act as inop-
portune or unwise; and it is not within the 
province of the judiciary to question the 
wisdom of the motives of the Legislature in 
the enactment of the statute. The provision 
in question was regularly passed by the 
Legislature and approved by the governor. The 
presumption should be and is in favor of 
validity. It must be assumed that the legis-
lative department, whose members pledge 
themselves by oath to support the Constitu-
tion, has not lightly disregarded that pledge. 
The Court elaborated upon this theme of presumptive constitution-
ality in Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1979), 
emphatically stating that legislative enactments were presumed 
constitutional and that particular deference should be accorded 
enactments that were primarily economic in nature. In a 1984 
case the Court affirmed its previous decisions and also stated 
that "the presumption of constitutionality applies with particu-
lar force to tax statutes." Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 
681 P.2d 184, 190-191, (Utah, 1984). It is also presumed that 
all legislative enactments are the result of the considered 
opinions of the state's duly elected and representative law-
makers. To find any statute unconstitutional, the court must 
find that no reasonable reading of the statute permits a finding 
of constitutionality. The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285 
P.1001, 1004 (Utah, 1930). If any fair reading of the statute 
permits a constitutional interpretation, the Court must uphold 
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it. It is against this strong presumption that the statutory 
scheme discussed below must be analyzed. 
POINT II 
A. THE BACKGROUND TO THE ACT AND THE EXTEN-
SIVE HISTORY OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN AND 
CONTROL OVER THE AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX 
SYSTEM ESTABLISH A STATE PURPOSE IN FUNDING 
AND OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. 
Except for the limited role of the State Tax Commis-
sion in assessing certain multi-county or specifically designat-
ed properties, valuation for ad valorem taxation is accomplished 
in the State of Utah through local county officials in each of 
the twenty-nine counties. To suggest, however, that because 
functions are reposed within the statutory portfolios of locally 
elected officials and financed partially or totally by county 
general fund revenues they are purely local functions, ignores 
the significant historical role which the State Legislature and 
State Tax Commission have played in all local assessment issues. 
Article XIII, Section 11, Constitution of Utah, establishes a 
State Tax Commission and provides specifically that: 
"under such regulations in such cases and 
within such limitations as the Legislature may 
prescribe it shall review proposed bond 
issues, revise the tax levies of local govern-
mental units, and equalize the assessment and 
valuation of property within the counties." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The same constitutional provision gives the State Tax 
Commission power to regulate and control local County Boards of 
Equalization and local elected officials with respect to taxa-
tion matters. Utah Code Ann. §59-1-710, 1953, as amended, 
grants sweeping control to the Tax Commission over local county 
taxing matters. Specifically, it may "adopt rules and 
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policies...to govern county boards and officers in the perfor-
mance of any duty relating to assessment, equalization and 
collection of taxes" [§59-1-210 (3)] , "prescribe the use of forms 
relating to the assessment of property and the equalization of 
those assessments" [§59-1-210(4)], and "administer and supervise 
the tax laws of the state" [§59-1-210(5)]. Additionally it may: 
"exercise general supervision over assessors 
and county boards of equalization and over 
other county officers in the performance of 
their duties relating to the assessment of 
property and collection of taxes so that all 
assessments of property are just and equal, 
according to fair market value, and that the 
tax burden is distributed without favor or 
discrimination" [§59-1-210(7)]. 
It may "confer with, advise and direct county treasur-
ers, assessors and other county officers in matters relating to 
the assessment and equalization of property for taxation and the 
collection of taxes" [§59-1-210(9)]. As part of its 
investigative responsibility the Commission is charged with the 
power to: 
"investigate and direct the work and methods 
of local assessors and other officials in the 
assessment, equalization, and taxation of 
property, and to ascertain whether the law 
requiring the assessment of all property not 
exempt from taxation, and the collection of 
taxes, have been properlv administered and 
enforced." [§59-1-210 (19)]. 
Finally, to enforce its complete supervisory control over the 
local property tax process it may "cause complaints to be made 
in the proper court seeking removal from office of assessors, 
auditors, members of county boards and other assessing, taxing, 
or disbursing officers who are guilty of official misconduct or 
neglect of duty" [§59-1-210(12)]. 
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This comprehensive grant of regulatory authority and 
state control over all assessment and collection practices 
within the counties of the State is also evidenced by several 
specific statutory enactments relating to the performance of 
those duties. Chapter 2 of Title 59, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) provides a comprehensive statutory framework with 
regard to time frames, procedures, standards and methods under 
which local assessors, treasurers, auditors, and County Boards 
of Equalization must function. The Legislature and Tax Commis-
sion have, to a large degree, completely assumed control of the 
local administration of the property tax system. 
Consistent with the Constitutional requirement for the 
fair, equitable and accurate assessment of all property in the 
State (Utah Const. Art. XIII §3), the Tax Commission has been 
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to equalize the 
valuations of the various counties for purposes of guaranteeing 
equitable assessment levels in financing the Uniform School 
Fund. The revenues of that fund are derived to a large degree 
from a uniform statewide tax levy imposed by local school 
districts. To further state equalization and uniformity of 
assessment, the Utah State Legislature, in 1969, established 
comprehensive programs of assessor certification and examination 
and a statewide re-appraisal program with costs to be shared 
between counties and the State Tax Commission. This program was 
designed to provide for re-appraisal of all taxable property in 
each county every five years on a county-by-county basis. The 
Legislature also implemented a program of personal property 
auditing conducted by the State Tax Commission with cost sharing 
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by the counties. See generally, Laws of Utah 1969, Chapter 179, 
Section 1 through 6, [Codified as Utah Code Ann, §59-5-106 
through 111 (1953, as amended)]. 
In 1981, the re-appraisal program created in 1969 was 
repealed by the Utah State Legislature, (Laws of Utah 1981, 
Chapter 233, Section 2.) In its place was substituted a compre-
hensive program of sales-assessment ratio studies to be conduct-
ed by the State Tax Commission. The provisions relating to 
certification of county assessors, education and training 
programs conducted by the Tax Commission, personal property 
audits and assessment-sales ratio studies are currently codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-701 through 705 (1953, as amended.) 
With respect to the assessment-sales ratio responsibility of the 
State Tax Commission, Utah Code Ann. §59-2-704(2) (1953, as 
amended) provides, in pertinent part, that upon completion of 
the study by the Tax Commission: 
(2) "The commission shall, on or before the 
4th Tuesday of November of each even-numbered 
year, order each county to adjust or factor 
its assessment rates using the most current 
studies so that the assessment rate in each 
county is in accordance with that prescribed 
in Section 59-2-103. The adjustment or 
factoring may include an entire county, 
geographical areas within a county, and 
separate classes of properties. Where signif-
icant value deviations occur, the commission 
shall also order corrective action." 
Accordingly as part of the comprehensive State policy 
with respect to equal and uniform assessments, the Tax Commis-
sion has been given authority to order adjustments to values and 
even order corrective action (re-appraisal) when significant 
value deviations occur. 
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Finally, as part of its effort to guarantee accuracy 
of assessment for purposes of equality within the equalized tax 
levy supporting the Uniform School Fund, the Legislature in 1977 
(Laws of Utah, 1977, Chapter 22, Sections 1 through 4) provided 
that uniform minimum standards for real property plat maps used 
by counties for property tax assessments would be established by 
a separate committee chaired by a member of the State Tax 
Commission. The statutes provide that all plat maps prepared by 
local elected county recorders and assessors must conform to 
those standards and that the counties would be reimbursed for 
the cost of correcting existing plats. The importance of this 
activity and its relevance to the support of the Uniform School 
Fund were deemed sufficient to justify the enactment of Utah 
Code Ann. §59-5-114, now codified at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-318 
(1952, as amended), which stated: 
Cost of preparation of revised plats are to be 
borne by the Commission and appropriated from 
the Uniform School Fund to the Property Tax 
Division of the Commission for distribution to 
the various counties... (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Legislature clearly established that equali-
ty of assessment between counties was of such statewide concern 
that an equalized statewide levy should be used to pay for the 
services. This financing mechanism is identical to that chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs in the instant case. 
The Act presented for the court's review is the 
culmination of five years of concerted legislative activity and 
litigation by cities, school districts and counties. See 
generally Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 
(Utah 1983) , and Boards of Education of Granite, Murray and Salt 
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Lake School Districts v. Salt Lake County Commission, et al., 
749 P. 2d 1264 (Utah, 1988.) In an attempt to resolve and/or 
eliminate continuing litigation over the apportionment of the 
costs of assessing, collecting and distributing property taxes, 
the statewide financing mechanism currently under attack in the 
instant case was duly enacted by the 1986 Utah State Legislature 
as S.B. 151. The method of financing an effective and economic 
statewide system of property tax assessment, collection and 
distribution was closely modeled on the financing mechanism for 
the State supported minimum school program (Uniform School 
Fund). See Utah Code Ann. §53-7-1 et seq. (1953, as amended.) 
Under the uniform statewide tax administration levy, 
local county governing bodies establish budgets for assessing, 
collecting and distributing property taxes, categorize those 
costs in the uniform budgeting categories adopted by rule by the 
State Auditor, and impose as a local levy a uniform statewide 
tax rate sufficient to finance the aggregated budgets submitted 
by the 29 counties. If, in any county, the levy for tax admin-
istration purposes generates an amount in excess of the amount 
budgeted by the Board of County Commissioners for that county, 
the excess funds transmitted to the State Treasurer for re-dis-
tribution to counties like Garfield County where the tax rate 
was insufficient to generate the amount required for the tax 
administration system. County commissions are free to budget 
and expend whatever funds they deem necessary to accomplish the 
operation of the property tax administration system. In the 
event the expenditures are not within one of the uniform cat-
egories adopted and approved by the State Auditor, the County 
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governing body retains the authority to provide for the expendi-
ture from other county revenues. 
The utilization of an equalized statewide levy ap-
proved during the 1986 general legislative session was a de-
viation from the previous authority of each county to levy a 
separate tax for the cost of assessing, collecting and dis-
tributing property taxes. The equalized levy was in specific 
recognition of the significant differences in property tax 
valuation throughout the 29 counties. Many counties such as 
Garfield County, possess insufficient tax base to fully fund the 
cost of property tax assessment, collection and distribution 
with the tax rate authorized by the Legislature for that pur-
pose. The utilization of an equalized tax rate was an attempt 
to minimize the negative impact of this disparity in taxing 
capability. As a solution it received the unanimous support of 
the cities, counties and school districts which are the three 
major groups previously been involved in litigation over these 
same issues. (See Affidavit attached hereto of Brent Gardner, R 
94-99.) 
It is against this background that the present Act, 
codified as Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15 (1953, as amended), must be 
analyzed. The present Act is the Legislature's considered 
solution to the need for an equalized, efficient mechanism to 
pay for the costs of a statewide property tax assessment, 
collection and distribution system. 
B. THE ACT AND THE TAX LEVY IMPOSED THEREUN-
DER ARE IN FURTHERANCE OF A STATEWIDE PUBLIC 
PURPOSE AND THUS DO NOT VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION ARTICLE XIII, §5. 
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Appellants claim the Act violates Utah Const. Art. 
XIII, §5 by allowing the Legislature to impose taxes for County 
purposes, by granting the State Auditor excessive control over 
local budgetary decisions and by forcing Counties to share 
property tax revenues with each other. In construing the 
statute it must be read so as to give effect to the Legislative 
purpose utilizing the plain meaning of the statutory language. 
The statute under attack is a funding mechanism designed, after 
many years and several attempts, to achieve a reasonable, effi-
cient and equalized system of paying for the costs of assessing, 
collecting and distributing property taxes. The Act unequivo-
cally provides that "to promote appraisal and equalization...and 
effective collection and distribution of property tax proceeds," 
proper officials, based upon reasonable economic data and 
assumptions, must levy a tax uniformly statewide. As has been 
previously set forth for this Court's consideration, the mecha-
nism employed by this Act is not an aberration. Other statutes 
resolve similar statewide concerns through funding mechanisms 
that reallocate revenues between local entities. As an example, 
the statewide Uniform School Fund levy also appears as a local 
levy on property tax notices. Utah Code Ann. §53-7-17, §53-7-18, 
and §59-2-904 (1953, as amended). 
Appellant's challenges to the Act rely extensively on 
several Utah Supreme Court decisions issued between 1901 and 
1936. State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66).1061 (1901); State 
v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P.337 (1904); Bailey v. VanDyke, 66 
Utah 184, 240 P.242 (1925); The Best Foods v. Christensen, 285 
P.1001 (Utah 1930); Smith v. Carbon County, 63 P.2d 259 (Utah 
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1936). These early cases are distinguishable from the case at 
bar both factually and legally. Additionally, several recent 
cases have significantly diminished the relevance of the earlier 
authority in assessing the constitutionality of funding mecha-
nisms authorized by the Legislature as in the public interest— 
especially where matters of statewide concern are involved. 
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp.
 y 540 P. 2d 499 (Utah 1975); Salt 
Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 
1979); U.T.F.C. V. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986); City of 
West Jordan, et al. v. Utah State Retirement Board, et al, 98 
Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah, 1988). See also A. Lynn Jr., "Finan-
cing Modernized and Unmodernized Local Government in the Age of 
Aquarius," 1971 UTAH L.REV.30. Under this latter line of cases, 
the funding mechanism established by the Act is clearly consti-
tutional. Finally, the clear distinctions between the statutory 
mechanism set out in the Act and those described as defective in 
earlier cases support validation even under the earlier strict 
construction of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5. 
In State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P.1061 (1901) 
the Legislature imposed upon counties the requirement of hiring 
and paying a pre-selected fruit tree inspector. This employee 
performed duties under the direction of the state board of 
horticulture and had the unrestricted authority to hire dep-
uties. In striking down the Act, the Court held that it imper-
missibly usurped county administrative authority, created county 
debt without county consent, violated the constitutional prohi-
bition against imposing a local tax for the solely local pur-
pose, lacked uniformity of operation, and lacked a state 
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purpose. There was no statement of state purpose in the act 
under review. The Court recognized the state possessed clear 
authority to impose taxes for state purposes. 1^ 3. at 1062. 
Substantial differences exist between the current Act 
and the scheme addressed by the Standford court. In the instant 
case, county employees, subject to the control of county offi-
cials, continue to perform their statutorily imposed respon-
sibilities. Budgets and expenditures remain under county 
control. Tax rates are applied uniformly statewide, and the 
funding mechanism furthers a comprehensive statewide public 
purpose. Uniform and efficient property tax assessment and 
collection were the same goals sought by the earlier state 
funded reappraisal and assessment plat review programs and are 
the precise public policy objectives articulated by the legisla-
ture in the body of the current act. 
Three years later, the Court again considered the 
application of Article XIII Section 5 to a legislative act. In 
State v. Eldredga, 76 P.337 (Utah 1904), the Legislature au-
thorized the State Board of Equalization to assess or value 
certain property situated wholly within one county. This duty 
was constitutionally vested in county officials. That portion 
of the statute authorizing state assessment or valuation of 
property situated or operated wholly within one county was 
severed and voided. No fair reading permitted upholding that 
portion in light of the specific Constitutional limitation of 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, §11. It should be noted that the consti-
tutional provision relied upon by the Court has been amended 
three times since the 1904 decision. The constitutional 
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separation of state and local functions has been abolished and 
the clear supervisory control of the State Tax Commission has 
been reinforced. In fact, much of the litany of potential abuse 
cited by the Eldredge Court (and by the Appellant) is now 
constitutionally sanctioned by express language. Eldredge thus 
provides little guidance to this Court in determining questions 
of state purpose and state taxation. In the case at hand, the 
Act can be read fairly without finding clear violations of 
Article XIII, Section 5 or Article XIII, Section 11. The duties 
and functions of each public official set forth in the Act come 
within and are consistent with the respective statutorily 
permitted duties for each such public position. (See, Utah Code 
Ann. §59-1-210, general powers and duties of State Tax Commis-
sion; Utah Code Ann. §17-5-52, -53, -54, duties of Board of 
County Commissioners; Utah Code Ann. §67-3-1, general functions 
and duties of State Auditor; Utah Code Ann. §67-4-1, general 
duties of State Treasurer.) 
In 1925 the Court again considered an Article XIII 
Section 5 challenge to a law providing for agricultural exten-
sion services throughout the state. In Bailey v. Van Dyke, 240 
P.454 (Utah 1925), the Court upheld a law authorizing county 
commissions to enter contracts for state agricultural extension 
services with local taxes. 
Certain distinctions between Bailey and the present 
case should be noted for proper understanding of the real 
issues. In Bailey, local governments could, at their option 
enter into contracts for agricultural extension services. A 
local decision supported by a local tax would result; no section 
21 
of the Constitution was violated. The Appellant contends that 
Bailey would prohibit requiring that taxes be imposed to fund 
the administration of the property tax system. Such a con-
tention ignores the statewide public purpose addressed by the 
Act. In the present case, a legislatively defined statewide 
concern required a statewide remedy and it is well settled that 
the Legislature in furtherance of a statewide purpose may 
require the imposition of local tax levies. Such is the case 
with the analogous Uniform School Fund levy described above. 
Appellant also seeks support in Smith v. Carbon 
County, 63 P. 2d 259 (Utah 1936.) The Act under review by the 
Smith Court involved the imposition by county clerks of probate 
fees graduated according to the size of the estate. At the 
outset it must be noted that Smith was not an Article XIII, §5 
case. The only reference to that provision is a passing one—in 
dicta. The case largely revolved around whether the probate 
charge was a "fee" or a "tax." The Court concluded that it was 
a "tax" which, because of -its graduated nature, violated the 
uniform and equal provisions. As the Article XIII §5 issues 
were not briefed the Court didn't address them. Thus the case 
is of little support to the Appellant since there is clear 
authority for sustaining the power of the State to impose 
burdens on local government and require the imposition of taxes 
to pay for them. The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285 
P.1001-1004 (Utah 1930.) 
Finally, Appellant relies on The Best Foods, Inc. v. 
Christensen, 285 P.1001 (Utah 1930) for the proposition that the 
current Act intrudes impermissibly into the right of local 
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self-government. In Best Foods, a legislative requirement that 
local officials grant and sell permits prior to allowing commer-
cial trade of oleomargarine was upheld even though the local 
governments were directed to charge and keep the administrative 
fees allowed. While the Court stated that the "very essence of 
local self-government/1 was the power of municipalities to 
collect and control revenues, Id. at 1003. it upheld the act 
first stating clearly the rule that a statute must be found 
constitutional if susceptible to a valid interpretation. 
Second, the Court found that the Legislature acted well within 
its power in imposing a duty on local governments to assist the 
state in enforcing the Act and furthering a statewide purpose. 
Id. at 1004. The Court also noted that the Legislature may, 
under settled authority, impose on counties the duty to impose 
taxes other than for its own purposes. Ixi. at 1004. This 
reasoning applies with equal force in the instant case where 
property tax administration has been the subject of extensive 
legislative control and state financial and administrative 
involvement. 
While these early decisions by this Court strictly 
construed the constitutional restriction on the Legislature 
vis-a-vis local governments1 sovereignty, the Court has taken a 
far more pragmatic approach in later years. These later cases 
stress the importance of granting deference to legislative 
enactments responding to statewide concerns, even when the 
concerns may initially appear as localized issues. 
In Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 
1975) the Court considered the Article XIII Section 5 challenge 
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to the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, Plaintiffs had 
alleged that the state's diversion of locally assessed and 
collected property taxes to a local redevelopment agency's use 
was unconstitutional. Finding the act to have a statewide 
purpose, the facial appearance of local benefits accruing to an 
agency controlled by a Board of Directors composed of the Salt 
Lake City Council occurring at the instance of a legislative act 
was not controlling. To respond to a statewide concern, blight-
ed areas, "the law is well settled that in exercising the powers 
of the state the Legislature may require the revenue of a 
municipality, raised by taxation, to be applied to uses other 
than that for which the taxes were levied." .Id. at 504. 
The holding in Tribe is important to the present case 
because it properly recognizes the Legislature's authority to 
recognize a legitimate statewide purpose (i.e., respectively, to 
rid localities on a statewide basis of blighted areas, Tribe; 
and create an efficient statewide property tax assessment , 
collection and distribution mechanism, and the concomitant 
authority to require imposition of a tax for or the diversion of 
local revenue to that identified specific statewide purpose. 
Following Tribe, in Salt Lake County v. Murray City 
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), this Court again 
upheld the Utah Neighborhood Redevelopment Act and found the 
diversion of locally assessed taxes to the Murray City project's 
use as a proper exercise of the state's power to tax for the 
benefit of the public at large. The Salt Lake County Court took 
the opportunity to reaffirm its earlier conclusions in Tribe. 
The Legislature is empowered to redirect the tax revenues of 
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local governments for purposes it has concluded are statewide 
concerns. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the Plain-
tiff Salt Lake County was not deprived of its taxes to the sole 
benefit of Murray City, The Countyfs "power to assess and 
collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation" remained 
intact. ]jd. at 1343. 
These two recent cases clearly demonstrate the Court's 
approval of taxing mechanisms created by the Legislature to 
resolve identified statewide concerns such as that faced in the 
present case. Even earlier cases relied on by the plaintiffs 
reference the principle of state purpose as justification for 
legislatively imposed taxes or diversions of locally assessed 
taxes. These later cases clearly note the overriding state 
purpose and uphold the legislative acts satisfying that defini-
tion. There is no intimation by the earlier courts that if in 
fact a statewide purpose were at issue the acts would not have 
been upheld. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently and succinctly 
stated the roles of the judiciary and the Legislature relative 
to public purpose enactments. 
Due respect for the legislative prerogative in 
law making requires that the judiciary not 
interfere with enactments of the Legislature 
where disagreement is founded only on policy 
considerations and the legislative scheme 
employs reasonable means to effectuate a 
legitimate objective. 
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 412 
(Utah 1986), citing Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979). 
Continuing in this narrative, the UTFC Court, citing with favor 
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its opinion in Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 
(Utah 1984) states: 
[A]cts of the Legislature are presumed consti-
tutional, especially when dealing with econom-
ic matters based on factual assumptions. It 
is only when a legislative determination of 
public purpose is so clearly in error as to be 
capricious and arbitrary that the judiciary 
should upset it. Allen v. Tooele, supra. 
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 
723 P.2d 406, 412-413 (Utah 1986). 
And finally, the Court described the nature of public purpose. 
What is public purpose varies and changes with 
the times. In 1890, it was held that the 
purchasing and operating of an electrical 
distribution system to supply electricity to 
homes was not a public purpose. Maudlin v. 
City Council of Greenville, 33 S.C. 1, 11 S.E. 
434 (1890) . In contrast, in the past twelve 
years we have found public purpose in indus-
trial development by a county, Allen v. Tooele 
County, supra; eradication of urban blight by 
a quasi-municipal corporation, Tribe v. Salt 
Lake City; and the providing of funds for low-
and moderate-income housing by a state agency. 
Utah Housing Finance v. Smart, supra. We 
cannot say in the face of those precedents 
that the stimulation of Utah's economy and the 
creation of employment is not a legitimate 
public purpose. It is closely related to 
industrial development and not different in 
kind. Whatever our private views on the 
matter might be, we must concede that the 
Legislature's determination that a public 
benefit would result was within its latitude. 
Id. at 413. 
The Appellants, at great length, reiterate that the 
uniform levy to defray the costs of collecting and assessing 
property taxes created pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15 
(Supp. 1988) constitutes a legislative imposition of a local tax 
for purely local purposes in violation of Utah Const. Art. XIII, 
§5. Ignoring the long history of State involvement and super-
vision over the property tax assessment and collection process, 
26 
it based its argument almost exclusively upon the fact that 
assessment and collection functions are performed by County 
elected officials. The argument is simply that if County 
officials perform these services, they must be County purposes 
and accordingly Utah Constitution, Article XIII, §5 must be 
violated. Such an argument ignores the historical development 
of counties, the relationship of counties to the State and the 
dual obligations of County officials in performing both State 
and purely local functions. In Utah, counties are legal subdi-
visions of the State. Utah Const. Art. XI, §1. They are 
organized and created by general lav;. Utah Const. Art. XI, §4. 
They are not municipal corporations of purely local character as 
defined in Utah Const. Art. XI, §5. This distinction is impor-
tant in the instant case since the Utah Supreme Court in Salt 
Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 560, 564 (Utah 1913) 
defined a "state purpose" for Article XIII §5 analysis as one 
"for the general public good, and not for a private purpose; 
that such purpose is not one which pertains to the corporate 
powers or interests of Salt Lake City." The critical question 
is then whether purely local self-government is affected. 
There, as in the instant case, "the state, ...simply calls upon 
its agencies, the counties, and the cities to assist in dis-
charging a public duty which in no way affects local self-
government." Id. at 564. Counties, as legal subdivisions of 
the State act as instrumentalities of the State in effecting 
State purposes. The State uses the County as its agent in the 
discharge of the State's functions and duties. Specific exam-
ples of this role are found throughout Title 17, Utah Code 
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Annotated. Sheriffs must serve all process when the State is a 
party. §17-22-26, Utah Code Anno. (1953 as amended.) County 
Attorneys must conduct on behalf of the State all prosecutions 
for public offenses within counties. They must attend to all 
legal business required by the Attorney General, without charge, 
when the interests of the State are involved. §17-17-1, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended.) County Assessors, in cooperation 
with and under the supervision of the State Tax Commission, must 
perform all the duties mandated by Tax Commission Rule, the 
Legislature or the Constitution. Utah Const., Art. XIII, §11, 
and §17-17-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended.) Based upon this 
mix of delegated State responsibility and the County quasi-
municipal police powers over purely local matters, Appellants 
err in suggesting an interpretation of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5 
that ignores these differences. The State of Utah has a long 
history of involvement in and supervision over property tax 
assessment and collection matters. (See Point 11(A) of Respon-
dents1 Brief). The State has paid for many of the local assess-
ment functions. As early as 1917 the State, with State general 
fund revenues, was obligated to pay a proportionate share of the 
costs of collecting and assessing property taxes. Compiled Laws 
of Utah, 1917, §1561, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, §19-16-16, 
and §19-16-16 Utah Code Ann. 1943. Specifically, those statutes 
provided "the sum (of the assessing and collection costs) so 
apportioned to the state and the state school funds shall be 
borne and paid by the state..." Clearly, the state could not 
legally expend state funds unless the expenditures were for 
state purposes. 
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Finally, this Court has recently addressed the stan-
dards that must be applied in determining whether a function is 
a "municipal function" or a "State function." In City of West 
Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board, 98 Utah Rpt. 37, (Utah, 
1988), this Court addressed whether the provision of retirement 
benefits was a municipal function, whether the Utah State 
Retirement Board was a special commission, and whether the 
legislative grant of authority over retirement benefits to the 
State Retirement Board constituted a delegation of municipal 
functions to a special commission in violation of Utah Const. 
Art. VI §28. In defining "municipal function" the Court reject-
ed the sort of strict categorization which the appellant would 
urge upon it and adopted a balancing approach. The Court, Id. 
at 40, enumerated some of the specific factors as: 
"[The] relative abilities of the state 
and municipal governments to perform the 
function, the degree to which the performance 
of the function affects the interests of those 
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and 
the extent to which the legislation under 
attack will intrude upon the ability of the 
people within the municipality to control 
through their elected officials the substan-
tive policies that affect them uniquely." 
In the present case, the funding mechanism adopted by 
the Legislature specifically recognized and addressed the 
disparity in tax base between the various counties of the state. 
Just as with public education and the Uniform School Fund, many 
of the counties of the state lack the ability to fund wholly 
from their own revenues efficient and modernized property tax 
assessment and collection systems. By providing a uniform 
state-wide tax rate the ability to perform the constitutionally 
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mandated responsibilities was extended to all counties, not just 
those with rich tax bases. Failure of counties to perform those 
functions affects not just taxpayers within the non-performing 
county, but all other taxpayers in the state through their 
contribution to the Uniform School Fund and the equalized 
funding of public education. Little is served in terms of 
meeting the constitutional mandate of equality of uniformity and 
assessment if only those counties which have adequate tax bases 
are properly assessed. Finally, the question must be resolved 
as to whether the statutory funding scheme "intrudes upon the 
ability of the people within the county to control through their 
elected officials the substantive policies that affect them 
uniquely." As a general matter no element of the assessment and 
collection process affects local taxpayers uniquely. To the 
degree that the properties are mis-assessed, the state as a 
whole assumes liability for lost revenues in the Uniform School 
Fund and federal litigation under the Railroad Revitalization 
and Recovery Act. Appellant asserts that the Act strips from 
local elected officials not only control over how they perform 
their official responsibilities, but also control over the whole 
taxation process and the levels of funding afforded those 
activities. That simply is not the case. The Legislature has 
uniformly mandated the functions of local officials as they 
relate to the property tax system. They largely act as agents 
for the state in the ad valorem taxation process. The levels at 
which they are compensated and at which they set their programs 
remain uniquely within local control. They remain subject to 
their local constituents in all matters respecting the size of 
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their offices and budgets and the efficiency with which they 
perform their functions. To the extent they believe it locally 
necessary to expend funds for functions other than those con-
tained within the uniform budgeting categories adopted by the 
State Auditor, they retain complete ability to pay for those 
functions out of other county revenues. This is no more nor 
less the case than currently exists with the Uniform School Fund 
and the local Uniform School Fund Levy imposed in each school 
district. 
While the foregoing is in the context of an Art. VI, 
§28 discussion, the elements of municipal functions under that 
provision and "local purposes" under Art. XIII, §5 are closely 
intertwined. The balancing test established by the Court for 
determining whether something is "a municipal function" is 
equally applicable in determining whether an activity is a 
"local purpose." In each case the pervasive pattern of state 
activity and control over the assessment, collection and dis-
tribution of property taxes renders those functions as something 
more than "local purposes" or "municipal functions." They are 
not "substantive policies that affect them (the County unique-
ly." West Jordan, Id. at 40. 
It is settled law in this State, as in all juris-
dictions throughout the Country, that the Legislature possesses 
the authority to require local governments to impose taxes or 
spend funds raised by taxes to effect state-wide purposes. 
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah 
1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 
1339, 1343 (Utah 1979). Appellant chooses to ignore this 
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mandatory aspect of Tribe and Salt Lake County. Also ignored is 
the simple reality that counties annually budget, levy, and 
expend millions of dollars in the performance of duties mandated 
by the State Legislature as part of comprehensive Legislative 
schemes for effecting State policy. State offenses are pros-
ecuted, state Courts are supported, state statute violators are 
incarcerated, and state standards for assessing and collecting 
property taxes are complied with, all by County officials, all 
with local property tax dollars, and all pursuant to comprehen-
sive State mandated policies. As noted in a leading treatise on 
County law," ... Everywhere, even in states having the aforemen-
tioned constitutional clause, (referring to a constitutional 
provision identical to Article XIII, §5 of the Utah Constitu-
tion) , it is agreed that state legislatures can impose taxes 
upon counties for state purposes and can compel counties to 
spend for such purposes even though taxation will be required." 
(Emphasis supplied.) Antieau, Local Governmental Law, §41.07. 
Additionally, uniform and equitable property tax 
assessment, collection and distribution has been a matter of 
general public concern since statehood. Equal and uniform 
assessment is required by the Constitution. The state has borne 
the cost of statewide reappraisal programs. Equalized levies 
have paid for the development of local property assessment plat 
maps. The timing, sequencing, and performance of tax adminis-
tration duties by County officials are all subject to constitu-
tional, statutory, and administrative control by the state. To 
suggest that the current Act violates local self-government or 
constitutes legislative imposition of a tax for local purposes 
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redevelopment agency for the purpose of alleviating the state-
wide problem of blighted areas. In the present case, counties 
in which proceeds in excess of the budgeted amounts are gen-
erated by the uniform statewide tax administration levy have 
those excess funds are diverted to other counties in furtherance 
of funding programs leading to statewide uniformity of assess-
ment and valuation. Such a program does not necessarily consti-
tute revenue sharing between the counties, but merely a state-
wide funding approach to a matter of statewide concern. Accord-
ing, Utah Const, art. XIII §5 is irrelevant to the discussion. 
Even assuming arguendo that the funding mechanism 
prescribed by the Act constitutes revenue sharina between the 
counties, plaintiff's challenge to the Act on that basis must 
fail for several reasons. First, if the Act only allows volun-
tary revenue sharing, the aggrieved parties are not the plain-
tiffs but those counties which object to the revenue sharing. 
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims on behalf of the 
counties and accordingly its claim should be dismissed. Second, 
the clear factual evidence as set out in the Affidavit of Mr. 
Gardner and the joint statement of the Utah Association of 
Counties, Utah League of Cities and Towns and Utah School Boards 
Association, clearly establish that the Act was supported by the 
counties at the time of its passage. R. 94-98. Subsequently 
the Utah Association of Counties, by resolution of all its 
membership, or the executive committee authorized to speak for 
it, has, on two separate occasions specifically endorsed S.B. 
151 including the funding mechanism established thereunder. 
Finally, the Utah Association of County Commissioners and County 
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Nicholes v. Cherry, Judge, 60 P. 1103 (Utah 1900); Lehi City v. 
Meiling, 48 P.2d 530, 534, 535 (Utah 1935). 
In summary, Appellant's Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5 
challenge to the Act as "involuntary revenue sharing" must fail. 
Appellant lacks standing to challenge a provision that may only 
be challenged by the affected governmental entities to wit, the 
counties and, second, the record adequately supports that the 
revenue sharing of the Act is fully supported and endorsed by 
all 29 counties. 
Simply stated, Utah Const. Art. XIII §5 does not 
prohibit the diversion of local revenues to effect a statewide 
purpose (Tribe and Salt Lake County, supra.). Unless prohibited 
by the Constitution, the power to legislate on matters of State 
concern is vested in the Legislature. Utah Const. Art. VI §1. 
The 1983 amendment to Utah Const. Art. XIII §5, allowing volun-
tary revenue sharing between local governments is silent and 
does not specifically prohibit the State from creating funding 
mechanisms, even including horizontal revenue sharing, when a 
statewide purpose is involved. Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. 
§17-19-15, is a legitimate exercise of the reserved power of the 
Legislature found in Utah Const. Art. VI §1 and is not prohibit-
ed by Utah Const. Art. XIII §5. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S "DUE PROCESS", "EQUAL PROTECTION" 
AND "TAKING" CLAIMS ARE DEFECTIVE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW AND RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
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occur with respect to a tax. Fees are regulatory in nature. 
The amount collected to cover the cost of regulation must be 
reasonably related to the service provided pursuant to that 
regulation. 
Traits common to fees may be succinctly noted as 
follows: 
(1) Fees are charged in exchange for a service that 
benefits the person charged as opposed to a benefit to the 
public at large. 
(2) Fees are paid by choice by the person deciding to 
utilize government services. 
(3) Fees are collected to compensate the governmental 
activity for the service provided. 
Southview Cooperative Housing Corp. v. Rent Contro. 
Board of Cambridge, 396 Mass. 395, 486 N.E.2d 700, 704-705 
(Mass., 1985). 
On the other hand, taxes are imposed to fund the 
general purpose of government. Statutes duly enacted by the 
Legislature primarily to raise revenue may appear at first 
glance to bear some of the hallmarks of a fee. As the Court 
noted several years ago, if there is no attempt to regulate a 
business or activity or protect a public interest, the measure 
is a tax. Furthermore the Legislature may impose whatever tax 
it deems necessary and may require local governmental entities 
to assess and collect the tax so long as the Legislature is not 
specifically prohibited from so doing. The Best Foods, Inc. v. 
Christensen, 285 P.1001, 1003-1004 (Utah, 1930). Admittedly the 
Legislature may choose to denominate a measure as either a fee 
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guarantees. If such were the case, there could be no rational 
basis for sustaining taxes such as the Uniform School Fund Levy 
or the Local Option Sales and Use Tax (a portion of which is 
distributed on a per capita basis regardless of the jurisdiction 
in which the taxpayer paid the tax.) The two examples cited 
above are denominated by statute as local levies or local taxes, 
and have not been successfully challenged with respect to their 
imposition or collection. The funding mechanism set out in 
§17-19-15 rests upon an equally strong constitutional footing. 
Appellant's argument that it is denied the requisite 
political voice with respect to taxation matters ignores the 
requirements which have been established by the Utah Supreme 
Court. See generally Lehi v. Meiling, 48 P.2d, 530, 536 (Utah, 
1935.) Its interest in avoiding excessive expenditures is 
identical to and represented by each and every taxpayer in the 
State. Appellant has the right to appear at budget hearings in 
any county, it may protest the valuation placed upon its prop-
erties either by appeals to the State Tax Commission or local 
boards of equalization, and finally, it may petition the Legis-
lature for a change in the law. Significantly, such a change 
was sought in the 1988 general session and rejected by a deci-
sive vote of that body. Additionally, Appellant did not appear 
at the 1987 or 1988 budget hearings of the Garfield County 
Commission. See Affidavit of Hazel Houston. (R-216-219.) 
Appellant further contends that its due process rights 
are violated because it is centrally assessed by the State Tax 
Commission, and the tax amount levied against it is not substan-
tially equivalent to the burden it imposes or the benefit it 
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provide a mechanism for judicial disapproval under the 
Commerce Clause of state taxes that are excessive. 
This asserti 01 1 reveals that appellants labor under a 
mi sconception about a court's role in cases such as 
this. The simple fact is that the appropriate level 
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reasonably related to the value of the services 
provided to the activity. Instead, our consistent 
rule has been: 
"Nothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposi-
tion of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who 
enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, and who 
are not responsible for the condition to be remedied. 
"A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we 
have said, a means of distributing the burden of the 
cost of government. The only benefit to which the 
taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived 
from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an 
organized society, established and safeguarded by the 
devotion of taxes to public purposes. Any other view 
would preclude the levying of taxes except as they are 
used to compensate for the burden on those who pay 
them, and would involve abandonment of the most 
fundamental principle of government—that it exists 
primarily to provide for the common good. Carmichael 
v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-523 
(1937) (citations and footnote omitted.) 
While Appellant does raise equal protection challenges 
not raised by the Appellants in Commonwealth, Appellant's equal 
protection rights are adequately safeguarded by the remedies 
available to all taxpayers—including it. 
It is clear that significant benefits flow to all 
taxpayers of the State, be they centrally or locally assessed, 
when properties are appropriately valued and tax values are 
equalized so as to assure that each property is taxed only in 
proportion to its value at an equal and uniform rate. These are 
indirect benefits which the Appellant receives by virtue of the 
funding mechanism established in Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15. 
Appellant wishes to dismiss these indirect benefits as of no 
consequence in determining whether its equal protection or due 
process rights have been violated. The Commonwealth Edison 
Court spoke to that question as well. Id. at 628 and 629: 
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benefits from the system it attacks. It has the equal pro-
tection and due process guarantees afforded it by the Constitu-
tion. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. 
Article XIII, §5 analysis is ultimately not only a 
legal analysis of the specific provisions of a challenged act, 
but also a philosophical analysis of the fundamental inter-rela-
tionships between local and state governments. Article XIII, §5 
is predicated upon the assumption that remote state officials 
should not force local elected officials to levy taxes for what 
state officials might think are necessary local functions. It 
is a constitutional principle which speaks of co-existence, a 
separation of responsibility and of direct accountability 
between local elected officials and their constituents for 
purely local decisions. The thrust of the Appellant's claims is 
that the Act violates Art. XIII, §5 by creating too great an 
intrusion by the State into purely local affairs. As the 
keystone of Art. XIII, §5 is this inter-governmental relation-
ship, Respondents respectfully submit that Appellant lacks 
standing to assert the Art. XIII, §5 challenges. The only 
proper parties are the counties themselves and their elected 
officials. Respondent, Garfield County, voluntarily budgeted in 
accordance with the Act and imposed the tax levy authorized 
thereunder. No challenge was made by Garfield County or any of 
the 29 counties to the funding mechanism. Appellant stands in 
the position of any other taxpayer with respect to this issue. 
Its benefits and burdens and the impact of the Act upon it are 
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consideration of th^ trad i*-: ^  ax sianciLa reauirements. Has the 
appellee* c-M^fered a n-.a' -ind dist':^-- • :vuiv cauaed the 
o>; 
•p 
Mere allegations c: idv-'rs- impact ar-1 insufficient. m truth, 
1
 - - - the A c t tiic A r - ^ : - j . " o.id les.? -. •• '"%' tield *Vnir+' f"/ the 
costo .. f assessing .;.-..: ..c-.~c i.t J
 L
 I
 . k • . - * -.- Id1 
County had been collected t :; rely sol-!y *.•: :ts own * ** 
"*f-=t ; -•- - ' - G S - S U L A I L . '---- *=: inalvsis 
the impact o^ : ... f*o4 or t.,.
 4 ^ - L re ^ovpreiar.t". ^ .a .. v... a-
tionships "" y.ca: ii.'. .-: i-r -Joverrr< :\z: ire only those 
* ! Cbi i-i 11 ci _: *uac * s . p pe 1 ^  a a t ^ ~ n * 
enti*1" vbr^° ?^,rer^-: enry i- ibridged h^ ~-,st act:on * r.e 
identified c e r t a n statewide public p<. : n. * o^ncei ns , plac^, -die 
obliaaticr^: ~~v" ^-^c-o ^«'H--opt: r-< * ' -." aovp rnme! • and 
provided J a 
program. The Appellant';- ic-' or ip'vf Ive.ner.i .i. t.:at . :t-;-.'. .3-
ti orshic- v ^hc t?s'i ^  c f r^l ^rr re t-nvpreiartM' precludes it from 
o b t a i n i n g s t a n d i i I g i 11 I d e i: t: h e • - !;: e 31.. a . 
The second ^Lament v tr>:- Jenkins tes4- war th* consid-
er a f i i • " l ' L~•' n * ' "* 'x" a i nt i f f -" rn: *• h - ^° ^ +• er 
interest xt^n^-. *iiu -w« a ...^. adequate. 
issue. .. plaint!:", s u m : the .\ppell.tn-, does \ obtain 
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standing merely because more appropriate plaintiffs are absent• 
It is clear from the analysis of the Art. XIII, §5 consid-
erations that the only appropriate parties are the counties or 
their elected officials. The Appellant may not bootstrap itself 
into their position merely by asserting their absence. 
Finally, in Jenkins, the Court turned to the question 
of whether "the issues raised by the plaintiff are of sufficient 
public importance in and of themselves to grant him standing." 
Id. As a taxpayer, the Appellant is no different than any other 
member of society. Its personal interest in the Art. XIII, §5 
issue of relative sovereignty and independence of state and 
local governments is remote. The doctrine of "great public 
interest and societal impact" should not be applied. 
In summary, the Pespondents assert that the Appellant 
lacks standing to raise the constitutional questions framed in 
the Art. XIII, §5 analysis. Questions of the balance between 
state and local autonomy, the ability of the State to mandate 
functions in furtherance of State purposes and the requirement 
of providing funding to support those services are appropriately 
raised only by the local governments affected. The Appellant's 
interests are too remote and more appropriate plaintiffs exist. 
It suffers none of the palpable injury which would traditionally 
give rise to standing. Accordingly, standing should be denied 
and the judgment of the trial court sustained. 
VI. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Senate Bill 151 was a result of several years of 
county legislative efforts in pursuit of a solution to the 
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problem .-- * .: -v *: ^  property u iv a^mj" : -" r&tior «;irr c: : ne 
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. . a., - ' " AX Commission. "'~ --H^ws 
county official: •„ o>, U.,M- a, .,« r *'nrm their stat~: ;.:1v 
de?icuctned ^esporr: bilities; Boards - ;,cu;ity Commissioners 
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"':ch *••'" "roceecis of 'a*'*1 T-> : c-^rr "--^  -• *:• ; a istrat i or
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through ca ::* other gener.;. ::.;..•.••.. - •. -
r/,ui.;ty officials1 responsibilities are impairec h\ * r.-.-
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mechanise --tab Jiahea — -; legislature .: : * penalized 
pursuit or a remedy for ,: Ftatewidt- piob." em. Si,.ct- j v a C u ^ a , 
the Legislature arv^  rta*-^ Mny Commission h.nvp bp-an in^egiuul.y 
collectic: and distribution system^ in ea<-r .:«:-up.t *;: '.it ct^te. 
r] * * ' nroco^ds from *•"'* j , _n: form S c h o ^ * <^ v' ^  >-•*-• 
U L I rorn e u u a ^  i< <.j^  an^uev* _ n - „T , jy 
for the reparation cf rt^: property ;ax laps, ' ra S:aD: J :. 
i * - luuu iever,ir " *• • • " * +' r " v ^  :*° ^f th^ ^n;i-c r-f 
the property . i system .:-- i--...* . 
vested ..; -.he r^^4- " . •- '"cmmission the auclcrity ;:"r?;.t of 
adjustment -:• . o J-i • aJuL- • « ^-appraiaa. . : *. i. 
ertfen suggest that the +-<?:' I^vv e?< .-; . ishoc by -ht- ;*r- :s 
n * :" b'tdte-
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wide concern ignores both historical and current reality. Under 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, Section 5 as interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 540 P. 2d 499 
(Utah 1975), and Salt Lake County v. Murray Redevelopment 
Agency, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), the funding mechanism estab-
lished by the Act now under review is a permissible extension of 
legislative authority in a matter of statewide concern. It is 
not a legislative imposition of the local tax for a purely local 
purpose. 
In conclusion, the funding mechanism and budgeting 
mechanism are analogous to other funding mechanisms found in 
Utah law. It is directly analogous to the Uniform School Fund 
levy. Additionally the Act intrudes no further into local 
government responsibilities than any other act previously 
adopted by the Legislature delineating the structure and opera-
tion of the property tax system by local elected officials. 
As such the Act should be sustained and the ruling of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /j^day of jtfgM 
1989. 
PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Garfield County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS PETERS 
Special Deputy Garfield County 
Attorney 
KARL L. HENDRICKSON 
Special^BeplTEy G a r f i e l d Coun 
HENDRICKSON 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ^ii.tuED 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: 
Article VI, Section 1(1) of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The Legislative power - * " ^ ?+-a*-° <-->-^~^  hp vp.si-ec: 
1 ,. In a Senate and House of Representatives wr.ic:. shall 
be designated the Legislature - " *"he f:+-i+-° ^ f r4"--^  
Article XIII, Section J . *" tiv- ••••jh .'•::stii..L^ L ~ p?r+-
pi: c ^  ' ; Ar>~ * 
(1) Ail tangible property in tl le state, i lot exempt ui ider 
the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, 
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to 
:ts "aluv, to be ascertained as provi ded by 1 aw. 
Art: "••-• "-Til, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
\if . ,:<r Legislature shall provide by law a uniform, and 
equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the 
state, according to its value in money, except as otherwise 
provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature 
shall prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every 
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its tangible property,, provided that 
the Legislature may determine tl le manner and extent of 
taxing 1ivestock. 
Article XTXJ, Section 5 of the r*.ih Constitution provides: 
The Legisiat •:: r- :--hal* .ti impose taxes for the purpose -.5 
any county, city, town or other municipal corporation, but 
may, by law, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, 
respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes of such corporation. Notwithstanding anything to 
the contrary contained in this Constitution, political 
subdivisions may share their tax and other revenues with 
other political subdivisions as provided by statute. 
Ax t i cl e XXJX, Secti oi i 11 of the Utah Consti tution provides: 
There shall be a State Tax commission consisting o: . 
members, not more than two of whom shall belong to the sa..;,e 
political party. The members of the Commission shall be 
appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the 
State, for such terms of office as may be provided by law. 
The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the 
tax laws of the State. It shall assess mines and public 
utilities and adjust and equalize the valuation and assess-
ment of property among the several counties. It shall have 
such other powers of original assessment as the Legislature 
may provide. Under such regulations in such cases and 
within such limitations as the Legislature may prescribe, 
it shall review proposed bond issues, revise the tax levies 
of local governmental units, and equalize the assessment 
and valuation of property within the counties. The duties 
imposed upon the State Board of Equalization by the Consti-
tution and Laws of the State shall be performed by the 
State Tax Commission. 
In each county of this State there shall be a County 
Board of Equalization consisting of the Board of County 
Commissioners of said county. The County Boards of Equal-
ization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and assess-
ment of the real and personal property within their respec-
tive counties, subject to such regulation and control by 
the State Tax Commission as may be prescribed by law. The 
State Tax Commission and the County Boards of Equalization 
shall each have such other powers as may be prescribed by 
the Legislature. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS; 
The Statute that is the subject of this controversy is 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-19-15 which provides: 
(1) To promote appraisal and equalization of property 
values and effective collection and distribution of proper-
ty tax proceeds, the county governing body of each county 
shall annually separately budget for all costs incurred in 
the assessment, collection, and distribution of property 
taxes and related appraisal programs and submit those 
budgets to the state auditor for review. 
(2) The state auditor shall establish, by rule, categories 
of allowable costs and shall certify submitted budgets for 
compliance with approved categories. 
(3) Upon review and certification by the state auditor, 
the aggregated statewide costs shall be transmitted to the 
State Tax Commission for determination of a mandatory 
statewide tax rate sufficient to meet those expenditures. 
By June 8 of each year the tax commission shall certify the 
rate to each county auditor for inclusion upon the tax 
notice as a separately listed and identified local levy. 
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(4) The tax rate may not exceed a maximum of .0005 per 
dollar of taxable value of taxable property except for: 
(a) mandated or formally adopted reappraisal programs 
conforming to tax commission rules; or (b) actions required 
to meet legislative, judicial, or administrative orders. 
Taxes levied for this purpose may not be included in 
determining the maximum allowable levy for the county or 
any other taxing district. 
(5) In the initial year that the levy adopted under this 
section is effective, each taxing district within counties 
which had not previously levied separate assessing, col-
lecting, and distributing levies, shall reduce its property 
tax levy by an amount equal to that paid by the taxing 
district in the previous year for the cost of assessing, 
collecting, and distributing taxes. 
(6) Revenues received by each county from the levy au-
thorized by this section in excess of the amount set out in 
the certified budget shall be transmitted to the state 
treasurer for equalization and distribution to the counties 
in accordance with the certified budgets. Any revenue 
excess resulting from an increase in collection rates upon 
final settlement shall be deposited by the state treasurer 
in a trust account to be adjusted against subsequent years. 
3 
PATRICK B. NOLAN - #A 2422 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
BILL THOMAS PETERS - #A 2574 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
NO. -^HZS FILED 
JUL 13 1988 
CLERK 
<&s»#tf-
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH CO., 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
GARFIELD COUNTY: THE 
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: 
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT, 
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE, 
COUNTY TREASURER: TOM 
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR; 
THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL" 
HANSEN, ROGER 0. TEW, 
G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE B. 
PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN, 
UTAH STATE AUDITOR: EDWARD T. 
ALTER, UTAH STATE TREASURER, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF L. BRENT 
GARDNER, SUBMITTED IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF. 
CASE NO. 3273 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) ss. 
L. Brent Gardner, being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, and having personal knowledge of the following, deposes 
and testifies as follows: 
1. That I am the Executive Director of the Utah Asso-
ciation of Counties. 
2. That I have been employed by the Utah Association of 
Counties in that and other capacities since 1976. 
3. That among my principle duties on behalf of the Utah 
Association of Counties is working with counties on property tax 
assessment, collection and distribution matters, and drafting, 
negotiating and representing counties before the Utah State 
Legislature on issues relating to ad valorem tax matters. 
4. That in my capacity with the Utah Association of 
Counties and because of my duties for the Utah Association of 
Counties I am familiar with the subject matter of this litiga-
tion, in particular S.B. 151 (Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15, 1953 as 
amended), prior legislative enactments relating to the assess-
ment of property, and the collection and distribution of ad 
valorem property taxes. 
5. I am familiar with the re-appraisal efforts which have 
been undertaken to meet the needs of the 29 counties of the 
State of Utah. 
6. That I was directly involved in drafting S.B. 151 and 
negotiation and lobbying its passage. 
7. That S.B. 151 was a compromise measure between cities, 
counties and school districts in the State of Utah over the 
allocation of income derived from the investment of ad valorem 
property tax revenues and the expenses related to property 
assessment and tax collection in the 29 counties of the State. 
8. That S.B. 151 provided a funding mechanism to address 
a matter of statewide concern in each of the individual counties 
to wit: the accurate, equitable and fair assessment of locally 
assessed residential, commercial and industrial properties and 
the effective, efficient collection of ad valorem property tax 
revenues. 
9. That I was personally aware that local assessment 
levels had been challenged as inadequate in 7 consecutive years 
of litigation by railroads wherein it was alleged that local 
commercial and industrial properties were under-assessed; that 
the State Tax Commission had issued orders to counties directing 
them to increase assessment levels in the previous 4 years; and 
that at least five lawsuits had been filed by the State Tax 
Commission against local County Assessors alleging un-
der-assessment of locally assessed properties within their 
respective counties. 
10. That as a result of my role in negotiating and draft-
ing S.B. 151, I am familiar with the duties assigned the State 
Auditor and State Tax Commission. 
11. That the role assigned to the State Auditor was to set 
forth categories of costs uniform throughout the State to be 
utilized by County Commissions or councils in budgeting for the 
costs of assessing properties and collecting and distributing ad 
valorem tax revenues. 
12. That upon receipt of the county budgets broken into 
the uniform categories, the State Auditor was to aggregate the 
totals and submit that figure to the State Tax Commission which, 
upon determination of the statewide assessed valuation, was to 
calculate a tax rate sufficient to fund the aggregated budget 
totals. 
13. Setting budgets, controlling costs through the budget-
ing process and expending funds was intended to and does remain 
the responsibility of The Board of County Commissioners or 
County Council. 
14. That the Utah Association of Counties, by formally 
adopted resolution, in November 1987, expressed support for the 
provisions of S.B. 151 and opposed any attempt to amend or 
repeal its provisions. 
15. On or about January 15, 1988, the Utah Association of 
County Commissioners and County Councils representing all 29 
counties of the State of Utah unanimously expressed support for 
the provisions of S.B. 151 including the revenue sharing pro-
visions of the Act and opposition to any attempts to repeal or 
amend the provisions thereof. 
16. That the attached letter dated February 24, 19 86, was 
signed by Kennith L. Dallinga, President of the Utah Association 
of Counties, who signed said statement in behalf of the Utah 
Association of Counties. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGJ 
DATED this (^ day of C^/sizLl^- * 1988. 
Utah Association of Counties 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /£rt day of 
, 1988, personally appeared before me 
o*T- V ^ U z ^ / J^/A^rUA^ i the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
JOTARY PUBLK NOT IC (J 
Residing at: 9he^/-Q+<*£4u»s ZJ&JLS 
My Commission Expires: c7 
OS//g/g? 
BPD:A 
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UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
UTAH STATE BOARD FOR VOCATIONAL EDUCATION 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
M Richard Maxfieid 
Chairman 
Darlene C Hutchison 
Vice Chairman 
Linn C Baker 
Neoia Brown 
Keith T Checketts 
Donald G Chnstensen 
Ruth Hardy Funk 
Valerie J Kelson 
Margaret R Nelson Bernarr S. Furse 
State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction 
February 24, 1986 
Honorable Representative Ted Lewis 
Utah State House of Representatives 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Dear Representative Lewis: 
S.B. 151, amended to provide for an equalized state levy, 
represents a positive solution to the problem of payment for 
assessing and collecting taxes. We support the concept and 
urge the passage of S.B. 151. 
Sincerely yours, 
-Zfrti r/Zt***^ 
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
UJJJJAAJ^ J^JIAAA^ 
/dt t 
UTAH SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION 
UTAH LEAGUE O r C I / l V E S 6 TOWNS 
250 East 500 South • Salt Lake CjterUtak^4111 • Telephone: (801) 533-5431 
PATRICK B. NOLAN - #A 2422 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
BILL THOMAS PETERS - #A 2574 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
NO. \3£%$ FILED 
AUG 2 5 1988 
^ 
CLERK 
UaZca22sL 'm&vn-
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH CO., 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
GARFIELD COUNTY: THE 
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: 
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT, 
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE, 
COUNTY TREASURER: TOM 
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR; 
THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL" 
HANSEN, ROGER 0. TEW, 
G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE B. 
PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN, 
UTAH STATE AUDITOR: EDWARD T. 
ALTER, UTAH STATE TREASURER, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF L. BRENT 
GARDNER, SUBMITTED IN 
OPPOSITION TO CROSS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 3273 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
L. Brent Gardner, being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, and having personal knowledge of the following, deposes 
and testifies as follows: 
1. That I am the Executive Director of the Utah Asso-
ciation of Counties. 
2. That I have been employed by the Utah Association of 
Counties in that and other capacities since 1976. 
3. That among my principle duties on behalf of the Utah 
Association of Counties is working with counties on property tax 
assessment, collection and distribution matters, including the 
collection, collation and compilation of data submitted to the 
Association by many of the 29 counties in the State of Utah 
concerning assessment, collection and distribution of ad valorem 
tax monies. 
4. That in my capacity with the Utah Association of 
Counties and because of my duties for the Utah Association of 
Counties, I collected financial and budget data from the various 
counties of the State of Utah concerning the costs associated 
with the assessing, collection and distribution of ad valorem 
tax monies. 
5. That based upon the data supplied to me by the County 
Auditors from each county listed on the attached Exhibit A, I 
prepared a summary and compilation of the full costs associated 
with the assessment, collection and distribution of tax monies 
for each of the counties identified on Exhibit A attached hereto 
and by this reference incorporated herein. 
6. That the total of said full costs for the year 1985, 
excluding Grand and Sevier County was $17,564,047.00. 
7. That attached hereto as Exhibit B, is a preliminary 
recapitulation of settlements and costs of assessing and 
-2-
collecting property taxes for 1985 which was prepared by me from 
data supplied to me by the County Auditor of each of those 
counties identified on Exhibit B which recapitulation sets forth 
in summary manner from the data received by me, the total costs 
billed in 1984, the full costs as budgeted for 1985 and an 
estimate of the final costs in 1985 based upon final settlement. 
8. That this preliminary recapitulation of settlements 
was prepared personally by me from data in my possession 
supplied to me by each of the Auditors of the counties listed on 
said Exhibit, and that said information was submitted by me to 
the Utah State Legislature in connection with its review and 
consideration of legislation relating to the cost of assessing, 
collection and distributing ad valorem tax monies within the 
State of Utah, 
9. That the information on Exhibits A and B is true and 
correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this X%T~day of dlsU^/jJ^—, 19 88. lis
 ^ T~~day of *$<0*M44T~ * 
^ ^ ^ eiftft L. BRENT GARDNER - Af iant 
Utah Association of Counties 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this XS^ day of 
(^^fUt^L^ , 1988, personally appeared before me 
ST. Y^LA-t-^^ ^a^ti^uisu , the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
My Commission Expires 
NOTARY PUBLIC , X 
Residing at; ?/ce-^iJ- y ^ ^ U ^ Zcta^A. 
BPG:C 
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1985 ASSESSED 
COUNTY 2F0LL*B6I5«985 VALUATION MILL LEVY 
Beaver 
Box Elder 
Cache 
CarLcm 
Daggett 
Davis 
Duchesne 
Emery 
Garfield 
Grand 
Iron 
Juab 
Kane 
Millard 
Morgan 
Piute 
Rich 
Salt Lake 
San Juan 
Sanpete 
Sevier 
Summit 
Tooele 
Uintah 
Utah 
Wasatch 
Washington 
Wayne 
Weber 
$ 116,419 
332,915 
550,943 
496,598 
61,991 
1,293,996 
431,142 
474,430 
194,961 
-
338,481 
232,205 
204,000 
473,540 
87,169 
41,313 
.U0,576 
6,000,000 
226,217 
180,671 
-
440,533 
414,786 
398,785 
1,937,224 
204,301 
436,826 
55,220 
1,828,805 
$ 34,736,677 
213,081,868 
239,647,356 
142,535,723 
16,327,977 
585,295,146 
242,111,612 
280,440,279 
40,967,953 
-
112,186,515 
36,559,810 
30,677,745 
70,038,122 
27,146,090 
6,210,584 ' 
33,314,634 
3,540,308,051 
183,286,647 
68,356,450 
-
674,878,147 
121,102,212 
408,863,889 
860,164,705 
57,646,046 
177,274,258 
9,170,855 
636,475,654 
3.38 
1.56 
2.30 
3.48 
3.80 
2.21 
1.75 
1.69 
4.76 
-
3.02 
6.35 
6.50 
6.76 
3.21 
6.65 
3.32 
1.70 
1.23 
2.64 
-
.65 
3.43 
.98 
2.25 
3.54 
2.46 
6.02 
2.87 
PRELIMINARY RECAP OF SETTLEMENTS AND COSTS OF ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES FOR 1985 
xty Final Settlement 
Total*Costs 
Billed^in 1984 
73,917 
179,325 
222,489 
200,662 
30,619 
395,431 
Full-Costs_ as 
Budgeted 1985, 
116,419 
332,915 
550,943 
496,598 
61,991 
1,293,996 
Estimate of Final Costs 
in 1985 Based on Final 
Settlement 
114,019 
213,989 
550,943 
363,933 
43,372 
953,380 
rev 
Elder 
le 
Don 
gett 
is 
hesne 
ry 
-field 
md 
)n 
ab 
ne 
Hard 
rgan 
County levy with county retaining 
all interest 
Phase in full costs over 4 years 
County levy 
County levy with county retaining 
all interest 
Phase in full costs over 3 years 
Full costs plus payment of new 
interest 
Full billing unless schools demon-
strate need for reduction at later 
date 
Reduced costs/^qual to amount of 
new interest ( 
Full costs 
Status Quo - no new costs, no 
new interest 
Status Quo - no new costs, no 
new interest 
Phase in full costs over 10 years 
Half year full costs starting in 
January, 1986 
Phase in full costs 101 first year, 
30% second year on 
Phase in full costs over 5 years 
starting January, 1986 
223,374 
234,577 
89,594 
67.235 
187,541 
86,489 
88,021 
215,716 
36,979 
431,142 
474t430 
194,961 
N/A 
338,481 
232,205 
204,000 
473,540 
87,169 
338,948 
415,519 
194,961 
69,552 
190,000 
95,138 
146,010 
241,498 
37,500 
**&£ 
Page One 
tty Final Settlement 
Total Costs 
Rilled in 1984 
Full Costs as 
Budgeted in 1985 
Estimate of Final Costs 
in 1985 Based on Final 
Settlement 
te 
ti 
t Lake 
Juan 
pete 
ier 
mit 
ele 
tah 
h 
atch 
hington 
•ne 
>er 
Phase in full costs over 3 years 
Phase in full costs over 10 years 
County levy 
Phase in full costs over 4 years 
Full costs with payment of new 
interest 
County levy with county retaining 
all interest 
County levy 
Full costs plus payment of new 
interest 
Phase in full costs over 3 years 
Phase in full costs over 10 years 
County levy 
Status Quo\- no new costs, no 
new interei 
i  ( 
3St__ 
Full costs 
Status Quo - no new costs, no 
new interest 
19,387 41,313 
59,252 110,576 
-2^184x202 /,*W, 03£> 6,000,000 
79,613 226,217 
125,864 180,671 
111,271 
205,408 
187,933 
182,321 
989,012 
140,198 
222,389 
21,000 
958,102 
N/A 
440,533 
414,786 
398,785 
1,937,224 
204,301 
436,826 
55,220 
1,828,805 
26,997 
65,177 
6,000,000 
124,840 
153,267 
100,000 
287,083 
314,055 
324,830 
1,087,913 
159,427 
222,400 
38,110 
958,102 
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PATRICK B. NOLAN - #A 2422 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
BILL THOMAS PETERS - #A 2574 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
NO. J?-??*f , FILED 
AUG 2 5 1988 
CLERK 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH CO., 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
GARFIELD COUNTY: THE 
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: 
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT, 
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE, 
COUNTY TREASURER: TOM 
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR; 
THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL" 
HANSEN, ROGER O. TEW, 
G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE B. 
PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN, 
UTAH STATE AUDITOR: EDWARD T. 
ALTER, UTAH STATE TREASURER, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF HAZEL HOUSTON, 
GARFIELD COUNTY CLERK/ 
AUDITOR SUBMITTED IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO CROSS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 3273 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF GARFIELD ) ss 
Hazel Houston, being first duly sworn upon her oath, 
and having personal knowledge of the following, deposes and 
testifies as follows: 
1. That I am the duly elected, qualified and acting 
Garfield County Clerk/Auditor. 
2. That I have served in the capacity as Garfield County 
Clerk/Auditor, since January 1, 1984. 
3. That among my duties as Garfield County Clerk/Auditor, 
is to act as the Clerk of the meetings of the Garfield County 
Commission, and in that regard keep the minutes of Commission 
Meetings. That attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "A", are 
the minutes of the Garfield County Commission meeting held 
December 15, 1986. Further, attached hereto as Exhibit "B" are 
the minutes of the Garfield County Commission meeting held 
December 14, 1987. 
4. That in my capacity as Clerk/Auditor for Garfield 
County, I caused to be published notice of the meetings of the 
Garfield County Commission, and in particular, I caused to be 
published a public notice of the public hearing of the Garfield 
County budget for the calendar year 1988, and further published 
notice inviting anyone wishing to examine the tentative budget 
to do so in the Office of the County Clerk during the hours of 
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday 
through Friday. A copy of said public notice is attached hereto 
as Exhibit flC", and by this reference incorporated herein. 
2 
5* That further, in my capacity as Garfield County 
Clerk/Auditor, I caused to be published a public notice of 
budget opening, wherein Garfield County would hold a budget 
hearing for the purpose of opening the budget for the year 
ending December 31, 1987, a copy of said public notice is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "D" . 
6. That neither Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, nor any person identifying themselves as a representa-
tive of or for and in behalf of Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, appeared at the hearing on the 1987 Garfield 
County Budget, nor the hearing on the 1988 Garfield County 
Budget. 
7. That the above and foregoing statements are true to 
the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and as to 
those matters stated upon information and belief, I believe the 
same to be true. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this %5^ day of \\{\ nit 0 ^  / 1988. 
JTONj - Affiant HAZfL/HOUSTO ;
Garfield County Clerk/Auditor 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this QSZ daY o f 
IWkii , 1988, personally appeared before me 
PATRICK B. NOLAN -#A 2422 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
BILL THOMAS PETERS - #A 2574 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
NO. * . FILED 
AUG 25 1988 
XI CLERK 
I)*,JT>« A*.*M9USM^ 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH CO., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GARFIELD COUNTY: THE GARFIELD 
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: 
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT, 
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY COMM-
ISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE, COUNTY 
TREASURER: TOM SIMKINS, COUNTY 
ASSESSOR: THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL" HANSEN, 
ROGER 0. TEW, G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE 
B. PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX COMMIS-
SIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN, UTAH STATE 
AUDITOR: EDWARD T. ALTER, UTAH STATE 
TREASURER, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS HATCH, 
CHAIRMAN, GARFIELD COUNTY 
COMMISSION SUBMITTED IN SUP-
PORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO CROSS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 3273 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF GARFIELD ) ss. 
Thomas Hatch, being first duly sworn, upon his oath, and 
having personal knowledge of the following, deposes and testifies 
as follows: 
1. That I am a duly elected, qualified and acting Commissioner 
for Garfield County having served in this capacity since January of 
1985. 
2. That I am currently serving as Chairman of the Garfield 
County Commission, having served in that capacity since January of 
1986. 
3. Among the duties I perform as a Garfield County Commissioner 
is the proposal and adoption of the annual County budget. 
4. That I participated in the adoption of the 1987 and 
1988 Garfield County budgets. 
5. That in 1987 and 1988, the Garfield County Commission 
voluntarily adopted a budget that separately accounted for and included 
all costs associated with the assessing, collecting and distribution 
of taxes as set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 17-19-27. 
6. That the adoption of said County budget including the 
cost of assessing, collecting and distributing tax monies was voluntary 
in all respects. 
7. In adopting said budget for the years 1987 and 1988, 
the Garfield County Commission voluntarily consented to and approved 
revenue sharing between and among the several counties of the State 
of Utah for the years 1987 and 1988 and we thereby voluntarily approved 
and imposed the tax levy set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 
17-19-27 upon all taxable property within Garfield County. 
rJ3tr 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED THIS j5,'^ DAY OF AUGUST, 1988, 
Th6mas Hatch, Chairman 
Garfield County Commission 
On this the c*^ — day of August, 1988, personally appeared 
before me, Thomas Hatch, the signer of the foregoing instrument and 
acknowledged to me that he did execute the same. 
(^
. iQmisfr 
Notary Public 
v) K.^.T/YX.s) 
My Commission Expires: of. . ^ ^ 
